

# WHAT SHOULD A FUTURE WARRIOR BE PREPARED FOR?

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Subject Area – Topical Issues

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** What should a future warrior be prepared for?

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**Thesis:** Although the challenge for us is to fulfill future military forces' requirements, we do not prepare ourselves correctly for possible operations.

**Background:** We know that our primary focus is to protect our country against any enemy. We say that we are prepared but we are not. We deal with a broad spectrum of conflict and soldiers' tasks. Based on the views of political and military representatives, and today's world situation, there is a need for military forces to be ready for anything, anywhere, and anytime. We want a force with that capability and flexibility. However, we do not train that way. At the same time, we do not like to accept the fact that today's adversaries that we have to fight and conquer are such as drugs, terrorism, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and peace operations. In many cases, we do not like our military forces to get involved in such operations because we are afraid of an ambiguous and unclear enemy and we do not know how to proceed towards our ultimate goal. We can not simulate real conditions of such operations into our training.

**Recommendation:** We should involve our future warriors in many kinds of domestic operations, including police operations, to ensure their proper training for operations other than war abroad. Such domestic operations could include humanitarian aid, disaster relief, counter-drug and counterterrorist missions.

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## WHAT SHOULD A FUTURE WARRIOR BE PREPARED FOR?

*"Today in an age of push button warfare, space stations and satellites, and the most awesome weaponry in history, the soldier is still as he has been throughout history, the ultimate key to victory.*

*You may fly over a land forever, you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting young men into the mud."*<sup>1</sup>

FEHRENBACH - PROUD LEGIONS,

chapter 25

*"At a time when most states are reluctant to risk casualties among their well-organized and well-paid regular forces, there seems to be no shortage of men who are willing to pick up a weapon and defend the cause of their ethnic group, religion, clan, or tribe - usually as unpaid volunteer. To be prepared for that, we need leaders and soldiers, who have the experience to judge what needs to be done and know how to do it. They must operate effectively in spite of risks and uncertainty. They must identify patterns, seek and select critical information, and make decisions quickly on an intuitive basis. We will have to invest in education, wargaming and combat simulation activities, and battlefield visualization techniques."*

Operational Maneuver From The Sea

## INTRODUCTION

I would like to believe that soldiers are no longer needed but unfortunately today's world creates many opportunities for soldiers to be deployed and employed. Unlike the time of WW II, Korea, or Vietnam, and with an exception of the Gulf War, I believe that missions for our soldiers in the near future will vary from very limited war to humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations. I believe, however, that participation of our soldiers in any kind of contingency operations will be increasingly greater with time.

The chaos of the future requires that we maintain the capability to project power ashore against all forces of resistance, ranging from overcoming devastated infrastructure to assisting a friendly people in need of disaster relief to countering the entire spectrum of armed threats. We will resolve chaotic situations in which ethnic groups, street gangs, clans, and other nonstate actors wage the war of 'all

against all.' They can use weapons of mass destruction or may contemplate such equally destructive expedients as the blowing up of dams and the poisoning of water supplies. They can disrupt economies to the point of famine and societies to the point of lawlessness.<sup>2</sup>

In many cases it will be difficult to describe a military task and mission, to define what should be done tactically, to get to our target, specially concerning an individual soldier task. However, in today's world with so many possibilities it is very difficult to be prepared for everything. Even so, each soldier should be prepared for anything at anytime. This requirement is in conflict with a soldier's "civilian" life. We have to keep in mind that a soldier is a member of a society and, unlike in the past, he is probably married and has a family. Most of us are persuaded that married soldiers are more responsible and accountable than single ones. On the other side, they are always limited or constrained in their decision making process by their families. Unlike other members of a society, every soldier is expected, when necessary, even to sacrifice his life to accomplish his mission "even be the lone survivor."<sup>3</sup> However, he does not have to pass away to sacrifice his life because the real soldier lives two lives, a military and civilian one, and a sacrificing of life means for him to choose which one he will prefer. To do so, he might be a good soldier with family life suffering due to his job, or he can be a good father of a family and concurrently not be able to fully perform his job. Some exceptions may exist and he can be successful in both lives. Can anybody live his military and civilian life fruitfully at the same time when his child asks "What have you been doing all day, daddy?" and he is to say truthfully that he bombed a village, vehicles on a road, or whatever else, and he does not know if there were any children or a father of any children who could have been killed? I believe that each soldier wages his own interior war, a

war between the military and civilian part of his soul. Most soldiers hope that politicians will be successful and resolve a potential crisis, making it unnecessary for soldiers to wage a war as a continuation of policy by another means.

However, if any war starts, it will be a multinational one. This is a reality of today's world. We should show everybody that we are prepared to build up multinational forces for dealing with any kind of crisis, terrorist acts, or other contingency operations. Each country should be aware that it can not do whatever it likes because we live in one world, and every country and its activities have an impact on the rest of us. From that view, I believe that all of us are compelled to work together against any wrong directed towards any country and its population regardless of race or religion. For soldiers to be ready to deal with this broad cultural spectrum, it requires [to have also] knowledge about each specific region before being exposed to it, specially for peace operations. I can say that each participant in peace operations plays a strategic role. I mean that the behavior or action of a single soldier can have an influence at the strategic level of that particular mission and operation.

I believe that we, as soldiers, must be prepared to deal with killing and the passing away of people on one side while protecting, helping, and teaching people on the other side. Let me say that so far soldiers have been used to do their primarily job, waging war. However, the last few years have shown us that soldiers have to be ready for many contingency operations ranging from counterdrugs, through humanitarian, to disaster relief and peacemaking both at home and abroad. To possess those capabilities, we have to be trained and educated for those operations. We should know what we are to do and how to act under any circumstances to accomplish our mission. To achieve that, soldiers

should be more involved in resolving domestic problems such as counterdrug and counterterrorist operations that provide realistic training; also failure on our own soil is not so painful and does not have the unpredictable impact on international relationships as a real contingency employment failure abroad could have. However, I think that in most cases, a soldier's first real employment and experience with live ammunition, as well as reduced supervision, is abroad. We should not be surprised if we face many problems and accidents because we really have not trained for this kind of operation. We have only played to be soldiers.

In addition to that, having lived with his interior struggle, each soldier with his peers has to create a cohesive team, where everybody is in concert with each other. They must be able to rely upon each other, but, at the same time, each of them must be able to deal independently. To achieve that, how should a future warrior be trained and educated?

#### **WHAT SHOULD A FUTURE WARRIOR BE PREPARED FOR?**

People are the armed forces; at the end of the day, our success in war or in peace will rest ultimately on the men and women of the armed forces. The skills and vitality of our people will also provide the driving force for shaping change. Our goal is a joint force persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.

I am persuaded that no country today faces a long and protracted conflict with its rival. Instead, we must be prepared to meet various and sometimes unanticipated crises that require use of military force. We should tailor our forces to be capable of fighting and winning wars to defend each particular country and be able to fight as a coalition to protect any other country when necessary. These conflicts are likely to be "come as you are" wars. We will need a ready force, rapid mobility, tailored and flexible maintenance

support and greater reliance on private-sector suppliers. We should focus on readiness, quality of life, and modernization of our forces to be ready for all contingencies.<sup>4</sup>

When we talk about "any form of conflict" it includes operations other than war. Those operations are going to be primarily multinational ones and we have to be prepared to work in concert with our allies, and most likely, in an unconventional environment. Highly mobile forces will be essential to all kinds of future operations. To prepare, we should follow the logical approach from training and educating the individual warfighter at the beginning of our process all the way through to training for large multinational forces. We as soldiers have to be molded through realistic and stressful training, involving institutional, on-the-job, and self-study methods, to have the skills and character to execute our tasks successfully. Furthermore, because each country's military forces are expensive, they should also be employed for resolving domestic problems such as terrorism, drugs, disaster relief and others. Those operations would provide the best training for upcoming missions. However, to build a professionally prepared force, we need to attract the right people. This is not an easy task. We can attract them by challenging their intellectual tools, physical skills, and motivation. In addition, quality of life will very likely be a decisive factor. Having people join military forces, we must continue to take care of them, meeting their social needs and equipping them with what they need to fulfill their required tasks in a safe and reliable manner. Being prepared for fighting and winning wars remains the primary task for soldiers. Individual soldiers should be more powerful than ever before due to the available products of the technological boom of the last several years; there is an array of detection, targeting and communications equipment. This will multiply the small units'

power and might be also very useful in a wide range of contingency operations. We can predict that using technology will increase an effect on targets and demands on personnel. Technology is moving so fast that we can train today in areas that were [in years past] very expensive and infrequent. Computer games allow practicing small unit tactics because several soldiers can interact in the same game on separate computers. For instance, soldiers waiting for the order to go ashore could become familiar with the area and what each of their duties could be during the mission. Each unit could practice clearing rooms, traversing corridors, and drilling their tasks.<sup>5</sup>

Even though it appears that we will need fewer soldiers to destroy a target and accomplish our tasks, in many military missions an occupation of the ground and intensive physical presence will still play a more decisive role than technology, especially in environments such as cities or jungles. However, increased capability of individuals and small units, greater mobility and increased dispersion will require additional communications and coordination capabilities since the synchronization of these dispersed elements will become even more important. This means that we have to find a right proportionality between technology and human assets to be prepared to fight all kinds of military operations. It was true during WW II and it is true today.

The nature of the terrain broke most engagements into small units scraps in which success is dependent upon the individual soldiers, NCO's, and PL's ability to act promptly and intelligently when confronted with a situation. .. The soldiers and marines had seen repeatedly demonstrated the obvious truth that success in war demands skillful and vigorous leadership from all ranks charged with the responsibility of providing leadership.<sup>6</sup>

These individual soldiers and small units optimized for war must, however, be capable of operating in operations other than war such as counterdrug control,

counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance in peacetime and peace operations in a near-hostile environment. These forces should possess the adaptability, initiative, and teamwork capability to meet all requirements for defeating the enemy.<sup>7</sup>

To achieve a military force with those capabilities, we should concentrate on areas such as training strategies, organizational design as mix of heavy and light forces, leader training, digitization, doctrine, quality of people, and equipment.

Dealing with these areas we should be focused on "rock drill" training that prepares our soldiers to exploit our information domination. However, we have to improve our capabilities in communications because the passing of information is insufficient. We must use smart jamming against an enemy to achieve overwhelming information superiority. If our well educated and trained leaders have the correct information at the right time, they should be able to make a sound decision that will bring us straight towards our ultimate target with fewest casualties. To have a real impact on an enemy we must improve our night technology to have a big psychological effect upon an enemy. We have to remember that technology for an individual soldier becomes a challenge.

Continuous operations by joint and multinational task forces represent other challenges for today and the near future. The IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia involves great uncertainty and highlights NATO's need to streamline and modernize. This task is a big challenge for NATO's command and decision-making structures which were geared almost exclusively toward executing a known plan with predesignated forces against a known adversary.<sup>8</sup> However, the operations in our future will be filled with uncertainty and we have to be prepared.

Since we will be tasked to execute all kinds of missions, we should design our forces in order to accomplish the following: to dominate battlespace and control battlefield tempo with an overwhelming lethality and superior survivability; to mount, execute, and recover from operations simultaneously; to be capable of quick decisive victory with minimum casualties; to be rapidly deployable and operationally agile; to be deployable directly to combat; to enhance tailorability through modularity; to be capable of deception and psychological operations; to have effective media relations; to use presence of sensors; to be capable of simultaneous operations, and civilian-military operations; to mass effects not forces, and enhance tactical surprise; and to sustain operations.

In other words, our soldiers and forces have to possess versatility, agility, lethality, and be able to dictate the tempo; have improved survivability and protection capacities; be capable of dispersed operations, as well as limited visibility operations; have improved air defense and ballistic protection including WMD and lasers; make informed decisions and impede the enemy's abilities; project, protect, sustain, set conditions, and execute decisive operations simultaneously; use the central intent and parallel planning with distributive execution; provide the right force to the right place using precision fires, maneuver, systems, munitions, and intelligence; be efficiently sustained through palletized load systems and improved cargo handling. Each soldier should bear in mind that what the enemy loses, he can't use, and what the enemy can't find, he can't hit. Each soldier should also be aware that we use every effort to make sure that what the enemy does hit, survives! WHAT won't change is that a soldier won't be a cyberwarrior!<sup>9</sup>

To have the type of military force described above, we could say that we are ready for a war. Unfortunately, and fortunately at the same time, there is a higher chance to go to any other type of contingency operation than to a conventional war. Since we would like to be ready for any contingency mission, we should not miss an opportunity to execute that kind of task. An individual soldier needs to know that fulfilling his task and exhibiting proper behavior is important for a mission to be successful. Every participant should know that tasks will be continuously changed and many times hard to define and carry out. This seems to be the same as in a war but it is something completely different. We have to obey our rules of engagement, which are difficult to set up.

During the Americans' first approach toward Haiti, it was quickly realized this was not war. They arrived to different conditions than they had been prepared for. Their rules of engagement and their orders to establish general security without becoming street cops did not fit together. There was a lot of confusion at the beginning due to this mismatch. US soldiers could only observe as the capital's security forces brutally hit pro-Aristide crowds assembled to watch the Americans arrive. The liberators appeared to have turned into collaborators.

US soldiers were ready to conduct offensive operations but the invasion was suddenly canceled. However, the same US troops went ashore later to "cooperate" with the Haitian soldiers they had been ready to kill only days before. Many soldiers were surprised by the Haiti-USA agreement that provided for a general amnesty and spoke of honorable retreat for despots from Haiti and established a US military partnership with the Haitian armed forces. It was difficult for soldiers to understand what President Clinton had meant by "the clean sweep of the monsters" from Haiti just a few days

before. One of many tasks was "reforming the Haitian armed forces and taming the country's violent politics." Execution of that was a long term goal and very likely the US military intervention was not going to last that long.<sup>10</sup>

How can we train our soldiers to be so adaptive? Is it possible to get them ready for those missions at all? I am not convinced myself about it. Having trained with US troops at Fort Polk for operations other than war, I believe that our soldiers will be trained and prepared for something different from what they will face when deployed and employed. This was my personal experience after being trained and employed in Bosnia with IFOR.

Even our politicians liked to say that they would not send out troops to Bosnia, as an example, unless all parties had signed a peace agreement. They insisted on NATO command and control that would protect the troops and ensure the effectiveness of the operation, clear rules of engagement, a carefully defined mission, and exit strategy for the forces;<sup>11</sup> however, the reality was different.

Ironically, the NATO IFOR in Bosna-Hercegovina at the beginning of its mission had to deal not with the Serbs but with the Croats in the Mostar area. That was the first major challenge and the task that was definitely not foreseen in Dayton.<sup>12</sup> NATO command and control was neither the condition for effectiveness of the operation nor an assurance of clear rules of engagement. To be effective, I would suggest the deployment of fewer "planners" and the establishment of an organizational structure more flexible to meet day-to-day requirements; such was not the case in the Canadian brigade. By May 96 it consisted of roughly a full-size Czech Republic battalion and a Canadian reinforced company with a brigade headquarters. "The planners" were more politicians than

soldiers and they violated instructions and orders concerning personal equipment in "separate zone," as one example.

To follow the Dayton Agreement dateline for executing particular tasks was soon impossible due to an "excuse" of the incapacibilities of "domestic" military forces. The mission at a higher level seemed to be military oriented, but at the lower level it was more of a police force mission. What is the difference between soldiers driving vehicles through towns, villages, and the countryside and looking around to see if everything is right, and policemen in any county in the USA, for instance? The policemen have more experience concerning handling civilians than soldiers do. A policeman's mistake is almost never an international "shame." They are trained to do their job and practice it on a day-to-day basis.

The rules of engagement for soldiers are the law that can not be violated, so they are scared and have problems following them strictly. Each soldier understands them differently. For each of us a direct threat and associated weapon use means something slightly different. We can not predict our behavior.<sup>13</sup> To prepare our soldiers to meet required criteria, we should use troops for resolving domestic problems along with the police. It is essential for soldiers to know how to handle civilians, both male and female, using polite manners. We have to be sensitive of cultural distinctions as well. Handling the evacuees, for instance, is a balancing act. We have to be polite, helpful, and concerned about their safety, and treat them like our families, but we also have to pay attention to our security and protection problems.<sup>14</sup>

I really see the future of military force consisting of contingency operations other than war. If we are going to preserve peace and our nations, we can not wait until full-

scale war starts. Today we focus on fighting and winning war, which is fine, but for many years we have done what we are not prepared for, such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, counterdrug and peacekeeping operations that have not been our primary tasks. Does this mean that we should not execute those missions or that we should refocus our training? I would say not to shift but to extend. Furthermore, we should closely cooperate with our police force in dealing with its day-to-day problems to get better prepared for our contingency operations abroad. I would even say that this collaboration is necessary for both sides. We can share equipment and knowledge as well as improve procedures from searching cars and personnel to controlling traffic. We should seek any improvement for effective use of force and means including funds. By combining training and real tasks commitment in domestic issues, we will prepare our soldiers for all required activities, both physically and mentally, within any contingency mission abroad.

We have to remember that many soldiers have families to take care of. That means they have to be prepared to leave their families for extended periods of time. However, they have to be sure that society will only task them when really necessary and will look after the families. We, as a modern society, have to be willing to look after our soldiers to have them when needed.

## **CONCLUSION**

Soldiers together with politicians have to establish and maintain a highly professional and trained military force. We have to understand to needs of today. We can not be focused only on readiness for war--not only because of costs but who else can help during all kinds of contingency operations other than war. The world today is different

compared to the past but still not totally safe. There are potential crisis areas such as the Former Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Mid-East, and we have to be ready to deal with them regardless of type of conflict. This should affect our military readiness and our way of training and education. Of course, our primary job is to train our troops to suffer, fight, kill, and, if necessary, to die.<sup>15</sup>

Our success will be dependent on our "boots on the ground." Technologically advanced weapons, communications and other martial sciences will reduce the size of the ground forces needed to fight and win, but never totally replace those forces. Their extensive physical presence may be necessary to fully neutralize enemy forces, deal with prisoners and hostile populations, or otherwise assure that success in attacking targets is followed to achieve the overall objectives of the operation.<sup>16</sup>

We must ensure that the new technologies do not overrule the human factor. We do not want robots. We must retain balanced and sustainable capabilities. We should acknowledge that the individual warfighter's judgment, creativity and adaptability will be essential to the success of future operations. Our success will depend upon the moral, intellectual and physical strengths of individual soldiers.

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#### NOTES

GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP, COMMANDANT USMC, address to staff 4 January 1960 - "You don't overlook the fact that no battle was ever won by marines in a boat, amphibious tractor, helicopter, ship or transport aircraft. battles are won by marines with their feet on the ground."

<sup>2</sup> General C.C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps "Operational Maneuver From The Sea," *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1996, 1-5.

<sup>3</sup> US Army Infantry School Fort Benning, *Ranger Handbook*, i..

<sup>4</sup> John P.White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, USA, "Outsourcing Stretches DoD Dollars." *Defense 96*, issue 3, 19 -26.

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- <sup>5</sup> Capt. T.V. Johnson, HQMC Public Affairs, Washington, DC, "New Technology," *Marines*, July 1996, 20.
- <sup>6</sup> John Miller, Jr., *The War In The Pacific - Guadalcanal: The First Offensive* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 307.
- <sup>7</sup> General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA, "Joint vision 2010: Force of the future." *Defense* 96, issue 4: 6-21.  
John P. White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, USA, "Outsourcing Stretches DoD Dollars." *Defense* 96, issue 3, 20. "Readiness depends on attracting top quality people and retaining them after they have developed technical and leaderships skills. To do so, we must offer not only challenging and rewarding work, but also an appropriate quality of life that encompasses the entire package of compensation, benefits, and work and living environments for military service personnel."
- <sup>8</sup> William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, USA, "Six postulates for NATO's future." *Defense* 96, issue 4, 3 - 5.
- <sup>9</sup> U.S. Army TRaIning and DOctrine Command (TRADOC) , "FORCE XXI / Joint Venture Overview -- Transitioning to a Capabilities Based Army."
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- <sup>11</sup> President B. Clinton, "Why Bosnia Matters to America," *Newsweek*, 13 November 1995, 55.
- <sup>12</sup> Colin Soloway, "A war-divided city resists unification," *US News & World report*, 22 January 1996, 41-42.
- <sup>13</sup> Gunnery Sgt. Mark DesNoyer, USMC, "Haiti," and Sgt. John S. Jamison, "France," *Marines*, December 1996, 30-32.
- <sup>14</sup> SSgt. Scott Woosley, 24th MEU, Camp Lejeune, "Taking Over," *Marines*, June 1996, 21-22.
- <sup>15</sup> Eugene H. Grayson, Jr., Professor of Military Operations, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, "Fehrenbach's lesson from This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness," US Army War College, 1990.
- <sup>16</sup> General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA, "Joint vision 2010: Force of the future." *Defense* 96, issue 4, 15.

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